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Questioning “Ritual Efficacy”
Johannes Quack & Paul Töbelmann
Abstract
This paper highlights the importance of making explicit claims and statements about efficacy in the study of rit-
ual. It argues against any general account of ritual efficacy, given that all kinds of actions can be ritualized with-
out adding thereby a specific efficacy sui generis. To situate their position in the history of ritual theory Quack
and Töbelmann first take stock of some of the most influential positions in this field (Frazer; Durkheim; Tam-
biah) and stress their commonalities and differences. 
The authors then put forward their own “interpretive grid”, establishing a series of questions as a necessary
precondition of any attempt to form a comprehensive statement about ritual efficacy. While the efficiens (that
which brings about a change in ritual) and the efficiendum (that which is acted upon in ritual) are important
parts of any such statement, other significant categories are the sphere in which a ritual is assumed to take ef-
fect, the means by which it is said to be efficacious, and the conditions which it must assertedly meet. Of further
importance is the perspectivity of such a statement and the special role of the intentions of the ritual practi-
tioners, given that rituals are understood as a species of the genus action.
In a final section, Quack and Töbelmann apply their “interpretive grid” to Catherine Bell’s influential mono-
graph Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (1992). They show how Bell’s ideas are built on mostly implicit notions of
ritual efficacy. Explicating these notions, the authors not only find Bell’s thought subtly influenced by
Durkheimian ideas (notwithstanding her claims to the contrary). They also develop an understanding of two
mutually dependent levels on which Bell finds ritualization to be efficacious.
Introduction1
Certain questions concerning the problem of ritual ef-
ficacy are notorious. Do people who perform rain dances
actually attempt to produce rain? Is it better to analyse the
efficacy of rituals as “expressive” or “symbolic” rather than
“instrumental”? Can the efficacy of a healing ritual be ex-
plained as analogous to the efficacy of an illocutionary
speech act? Can rituals generally be conceived of as inef-
ficacious actions, or is this only an unspoken presupposi-
tion of some ritual theories? In what ways— if any— does
the efficacy of ritualized actions differ from the efficacy of
other kinds of actions? Is it reasonable to assume that the
answer to the question, “Why are rituals performed?” has
to do with their efficacy,  their ability to actually effect
changes in the world? All these questions are related to the
observation that many rituals are seen by analysts as ac-
tions that fail to accomplish the ends for which, accord-
ing to their practitioners, they are performed. Emily Ahern
(now Emily Martin), in her article The Problem of Ritual
Efficacy (1979), calls this the “problem of efficacy,” viz.,
“For some cases, we might want to say participants think
their rituals have a certain effect; in actuality the effect they
have is quite different” (1979: 6).
Rain dances do not necessarily have an impact on the
weather, nor do healing rituals necessarily eliminate the
patient’s symptoms.2 Should we then say that these ritu-
als are ineffective? What is actually held to be affected by
the ritual, and by whom? Some might argue that a par-
ticular healing ritual is ineffective if it fails to reduce the
patient’s symptoms. Others may hold that symptom-re-
duction is not a necessary condition for ritual success,
and that there are other things the healing ritual in ques-
tion has actually accomplished. Some anthropologists
might claim that the practitioner’s aim is to “heal the soul”
of the patient while others might say that healing rituals
primarily “heal social relations” by resolving disputes over
land, inheritance or social station. What, then, is the re-
lationship between different assessments of ritual efficacy
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and the intentions of the people performing the rituals?
The main contention of this essay is that with respect to
“ritual efficacy” it is of the utmost importance to be as
precise as possible about what affects what, how, and ac-
cording to whom. We will show the complexity involved
in such an attempt, and argue that unless one does jus-
tice to these complexities, the vague and indeterminate
notion of “ritual efficacy” should be dropped.
All theories of ritual — implicitly or explicitly — adopt
a perspective on ritual efficacy, including those that dis-
miss the issue. But much of the work done in the field of
ritual studies seems to tacitly pursue rather specific no-
tions of what ritual does and how. These notions greatly
influence possible results and are strongly interconnected
with the methods used. This finding notwithstanding, the
question of ritual efficacy has rarely been explicitly raised.3
Therefore, this article has two interrelated aims. On the
one hand we aim to trace aspects of Emile Durkheim’s
influence on ritual theory.  This becomes visible most
clearly with regard to ritual efficacy. On the other hand,
we will highlight the complexity of the problem of ritual
efficacy. The first aim we pursue primarily by discussing
Durkheim’s influence on Tambiah’s notion of “perfor-
mative efficacy” and “conventional acts.” To reach our sec-
ond goal, we will discuss the central terms “effect” and
“efficacy”. This discussion leads to a framework of ques-
tions which we hope will provide a guideline to help us
understand and criticize explicit and implicit statements
about ritual efficacy. The interpretive grid we will pro-
pose is intended to be an instrument that can be used to
identify the assumptions of any theorist regarding ritual
efficacy, a claim we will illustrate by applying it to Cather-
ine Bell’s position on ritual. At first, however, a brief and
selective summary of the history of the problem of ritual
efficacy will set the scene for our discussion.
Intellectualists, Symbolists and Performativity
In anthropology the earliest explicit positions on rit-
ual efficacy were those of Sir Edward B.  Tylor and Sir
James Frazer, leading figures of a group of anthropolo-
gists latter dubbed the “intellectualists.”4 Frazer became
famous for his positions on magic, science, and religion,
as outlined in his voluminous work The Golden Bough
(1993 [First ed. two vols. 1890]). He understood religion
as “a propitiation or conciliations of powers superior to
man which are believed to direct and control the course
of nature and human life” (1993: 50). In contrast to re-
ligion, science and magic assume “that in nature one event
follows another necessarily and invariably without the in-
tervention of any spiritual or personal agency.” Frazer felt
it important to add that the “fatal flaw of magic lies not
in its general assumption of a sequence of events deter-
mined by law, but in its total misconception of the na-
ture of the particular laws which govern that sequence”
(ibid: 49).5 Frazer did not develop a specific notion of rit-
ual, but used the expressions ritual, rite, and ceremony
as synonyms. Although rituals could be found in the realm
of religion, Frazer’s main focus was on ritual as an aspect
of magic. The characteristics of primitive or magical rit-
uals are, amongst others, that (a) the performers are not
drawn from any special class of persons, (b) nor are spe-
cial places set aside for the performance of the rites, and
(c) the magical rituals “are believed to influence the course
of nature directly through physical sympathy or resem-
blance between the rite and the effect which is the inten-
tion of the rite to produce” (ibid: 411). In contrast to re-
ligious rituals, magical rituals are indifferent as to whether
they invoke an agent or an inanimate thing. For the in-
tellectualists,  the people who perform a magical ritual
conceive of their actions as a means to influence the course
of nature. So, rain dancers do indeed expect the weather
to change as a consequence of their actions (unless in-
terfering factors are at work). According to Frazer, they
are simply wrong.
Emile Durkheim developed a rather different approach
to religion, magic, and rituals. He insisted that in order
to understand rituals, the emphasis must be shifted from
the individual to social context. Rituals are to be explained
and interpreted in terms of particular social contexts, not
universal human psychology.  Religion,  according to
Durkheim, is an effect of social life, but it also symbol-
izes the structures and processes that constitute a given
social environment. It is functional with respect to soci-
ety, and therefore to the people, because it provides the
moral foundation without which society could not exist.
In his classic work The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life, Durkheim argued that religious phenomena fall into
two basic categories: beliefs and rites:
The first are states of opinion and consist of repre-
sentations; the second are determined modes of ac-
tion. Between these two classes of facts there is all
the difference which separates thought from action
(1965: 51).
His main aim in this respect was to study rituals as
symbolic expressions and to analyze their social functions.
The distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘magic’ is set up by
Durkheim quite differently from the intellectualists: for
him, religion is something collective in its origins and its
social function; it is collective, but “there is no church of
magic” (ibid: 50) because magic pertains to the individ-
ual. It is important, nevertheless, to see precisely where
he agrees and disagrees with the position of the intellec-
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tualists.  In fact,  Durkheim agrees that the distinction
true/false is important to ritual theory.  While the ex-
planatory beliefs stated by ritual practitioners are usually
wrong, science discovers the true reasons for the ritual
actions of the practitioners:
The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites
and the strangest myths translate some human
need, some aspect of life, either individual or so-
cial.  The reasons with which the faithful justify
them may be, and generally are, erroneous; but the
true reasons do not cease to exist, and it is the duty
of science to discover them (ibid: 15).
He charges that the intellectualists take the position of
the practitioners literally, and that this leads to a consid-
eration of the “apparent” or “physical efficacy” of rituals
only, while ignoring their “real” or “moral efficacy,” which
is of much greater importance to him (ibid: 402).  To
quote but one of many passages in which he develops this
opposition between an “apparent” and a “real” efficacy of
rituals: 
The real function of a rite does not consist in the
particular and definite effects which it seems to aim
at and by which it is ordinarily characterized ( . . . )
the real function of the cult is to awaken within the
worshippers a certain state of soul ( . . . ). Thus the
apparent efficacy will seem to change while the real
efficacy remains invariable” (ibid: 431).
Thus,  for Durkheim, though the people who perform
rituals have an account of what they do, this is of sec-
ondary interest to the scientific observer, who establishes
their “true reasons” for performing ritual actions by es-
tablishing the “real efficacy” of their ritual actions. The
position of Durkheim was central for the establishment
of two very different kinds of efficacy, namely, symbolic
and instrumental efficacy.6 This opposition was at the
centre of the so-called “rationality debate”7 and has, in
various versions, continued in anthropology to the pres-
ent day either by equating “symbolism” with an exclusive
focus on rituals as “expressive”8 or for a set of reasons
that are perhaps best exemplified in Stanley Tambiah’s
well-known discussion of the “performative approach”
to ritual.
Tambiah claimed to solve a “classical anthropological
chestnut that has exercised, to give a few examples, the
minds of Tylor, Frazer, Evans-Pritchard, and, more re-
cently, Horton” (1981: 128) by criticizing explanations of
ritual as “expressive/symbolic” as opposed to “instru-
mental.” Tambiah tried to overcome this opposition
through the notion of performativity,  where “perfor-
mance” was regarded as having both expressive and in-
strumental aspects (cf. Kippenberg 1995: 265). The con-
cept of performativity is discussed at length in his article
“A Performative approach to Ritual” (1981), reprinted in
his book Culture, Thought and Social Action, where Tam-
biah emphasises the conventionality of ritual acts as op-
posed to “ordinary” behaviour, where an “intentionality
theory of meaning” is supposed to be appropriate for the
latter and not the former (1985: 132). While an extended
discussion of “conventionality” and “intentionality” in the
realm of ritual theory will have to take place elsewhere it
will suffice in this article to raise the question whether
Tambiah succeeds in overcoming the opposition “expres-
sive/symbolic” vs.  “instrumental.” Adapting aspects of
Austin’s How to do Things with Words (1971 [1962]) Tam-
biah states that
ritual acts and magical rites are of the “illocution-
ary” or “performative” sort, which simply by virtue
of being enacted (under the appropriate condi-
tions) achieve a change of state, or do something
effective.
And he adds:
The performative aspect of the rite should be dis-
tinguished from its locutionary (referential, infor-
mation-carrying) and perlocutionary (conse-
quences for the participants) features (1985: 79).
The separation of the (perlocutionary, instrumental) con-
sequences of a ritual for the participants from its (illocu-
tionary, conventional) “performative” aspect constitutes
the core of Tambiah’s explanation of the efficacy of ritual
actions (understood as “constitutive acts”) as far as he re-
lies on Austin’s insights. He states that
there are also constitutive acts which, although they
realize their performative dimension, may yet be
uncertain of realizing their expected perlocution-
ary effects.  A classic example is curing rituals in
case of spirit possession, which, though performa-
tively valid, may or may not induce a cure in the
patient” (ibid: 135).
In cases like this Tambiah adds the instrumentality (“per-
locutionary effects”) of a curing ritual to its “performative
dimension” and we understand this as a replacement of
the notions of symbolism and expressivity with his con-
cept of performativity,9 all the while maintaining its op-
position to instrumental efficacy, which Tambiah prefers
to call “technical-causal” efficacy most of the time.10 He
further accuses what he sees as the “main-line tradition”
in anthropology — “Tylor, Frazer, Evans-Pritchard, and
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more recently, Horton”— of judging “rites solely against
the perspective and truth canons of Western scientific ra-
tionality” (1985: 135). If adherents of this tradition
insist on seeing magical rites as acts launched by the
actors to achieve practical results by suspending the
laws of motion and force as we understand these
laws in modern physics, then obviously such acts
must be declared false. But insofar as anthropolo-
gists are open to the proposition that magical rites
are conventional acts which should be examined
within a performative frame of social action, then
a new horizon opens for viewing the logic of such
purposive acts and the canons for their validity
from the actors’ point of view (1985: 136 — em-
phasis ours).
In our view,  Tambiah’s perspective leads to several
problems.  First of all,  “the actor’s point of view” re-
garding their own rituals is sometimes based precisely
on the will “to achieve practical results by suspending
the laws of motion and force as we understand these
laws”.11 A second problem is that Tambiah himself pro-
vides his performative explanations only in cases where
“the perspective and truth canons of Western scientific
rationality” tell him that a technical-causal explanation
will not work. In a first, implicit step, our Western stan-
dards of verification sort the “rational” from the “irra-
tional” practices. In a second step, these “irrational” prac-
tices are ‘rescued’ from the stigma of irrationality by the
concept of performative efficacy. Tambiah’s separation
of the “performative dimension” from the actors’ aim “to
achieve practical results”, i.e.  “inducing cure in the pa-
tient”,  resembles Durkheim’s attempt to look for “real
function” and “true reasons” of ritual actions opposed
to reasons the actors themselves give.  Like Durkheim
(and, indeed, like so many ritual theorists), Tambiah re-
places the “erroneous” indigenous model with his own,
exogenous model since “the reasons with which the faith-
ful [actors] justify them may be, and generally are, er-
roneous” (all quotes above).12
Our position is, firstly, that most people do not dis-
tinguish between instrumental and other (symbolic, ex-
pressive, performative) kinds of actions when it comes to
actions that are commonly labelled as “ritual”. Secondly
we hold that if a ritual is performed in order to effect a
cure, then the actors’ point of view concerning its effi-
cacy is as instrumental as it would be in the case of tak-
ing medicine. Such a perspective looks at the intentions
of the actors in order to explain the coherence and ra-
tionality of magical and ritual practices according to the
actors’ point of view, i.e. without making statements about
the truth-value of the underlying premises. Even though
Tambiah claims to open a “new horizon” for “viewing the
logic of such purposive acts and the canons for their va-
lidity from the actors’ point of view” (1985:136) he fails
to do so, because he opposes and privileges an exogenous
perspective (“conventions”) over an indigenous one (“in-
tentions”) and reproduces the opposition between in-
strumental and symbolic efficacy.
We will return to the Durkheimian heritage in Tam-
biah and the discussion of the efficacy of “conventional
acts” below. It is, however, necessary first to differentiate
the complexities involved by introducing more specific
questions with respect to the notion of “ritual efficacy.”
Questions Regarding Ritual Efficacy
To understand how rituals might be efficacious, it is
necessary to be clear about the terms used. Effect, effec-
tiveness, efficaciousness, efficacy, side-effect and conse-
quence are all pertinent here, as are ineffectiveness, inef-
ficacy, and inconsequentiality. We wish to limit ourselves
to a discussion of “effect” and “efficacy” since no more
differentiation is needed for the problems at hand.
An effect is usually understood as the actual result of a
cause. For the time being it can be said with respect to
ritual that an effect of a ritual is that which is causally
linked to the ritual. Such effects of the performance of a
ritual are potentially infinite. The effects of a marriage
ceremony in a church can include, among others, the fol-
lowing: the establishment of a kinship relation; a decrease
in the number of oxygen molecules in the church; the
earning of a small amount of money by the organist; the
community’s being blessed by the priest; the elevation of
a bridesmaid’s status amongst her peers; and so on. Most
such effects are usually beyond dispute.
An alternative point to make is to say that an effect of
a ritual is that which is asserted as causally linked to the
ritual by its performers, participants, witnesses and/or
researchers. This differentiation between actual and as-
serted efficacy brings us straight to the problem of ritual
efficacy: What about a couple being transformed into a
new ontological state before God through a marriage cer-
emony? Or what about the claim of the rain dancers that
the weather changes as a consequence of their ritual per-
formances? Here, it seems, one cannot avoid acknowl-
edging that the distinction false/true is important to rit-
ual theory as put before by Frazer and as implicit in the
position of Durkheim and Tambiah. This differentiation
is central for the “problem of ritual efficacy” introduced
above, i.e. when rituals are seen by analysts as actions that
fail to accomplish the ends for which, according to their
practitioners, they are performed. But — as we want to
argue here — the distinction false/true is neither impor-
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tant for a differentiation between “effect” and “efficacy”
nor for our aim to speak of ritual efficacy relative to the
interests of some agent.
Our proposition for the usage of the notion of (rit-
ual) efficacy as follows: efficacy refers only to some ef-
fects — whether they are actual or only asserted effects.
To state that a ritual is efficacious is to relate a particu-
lar effect or set of effects to the intentions, expectations
and/or perceived functions of the ritual. Such statements
are always necessarily relative to the perspective of the
respective agent.
This is a two-step process: first, a phenomenon is iden-
tified or postulated to be an effect of the ritual, usually
implying some form of causality. At the same time this
effect is connected with certain notions of what the rit-
ual in question is supposed to do — be these in the in-
tention of its operators and participants, in the expecta-
tions of witnesses,  in historical explanations, or in the
functions ascribed to it by researchers (which should cover
just about everyone likely to comment on a given ritual
at all). The statement that is produced is one about the
ritual’s effects in relation to some model regarding what
“should” have happened. Efficacy is perceived in degrees:
great or small, total or absent.
Thinking about ritual efficacy entails picking and
choosing among the myriad of effects a ritual is asserted
to have. It is all about picking and choosing which as-
pects of ritual one wishes to identify in a statement about
efficacy.  It comes as no surprise that usually the most
important difference in this regard is that between aca-
demic observer and native practitioner. This difference
reflects a number of discrepancies in belief about the
workings of the world in general and the focus of the
ritual in particular.  One difference between observers’
and practitioners’ perspectives can be crucial,  namely
that the practitioners’ beliefs about the effects of a rit-
ual,  in the context of their desires, provides a sufficient
reason to perform it,  but this might not the case for the
observer.13 It is,  however,  not at all necessary to make
statements about the truth-value of the underlying be-
liefs about the effects of a ritual in order to understand
why people hold such beliefs in the first place and how
these beliefs are reason enough for them to perform rit-
ualized actions.
A simple question suffices to summarize all of the
above considerations concerning ritual efficacy: “In rit-
ual, what or who affects what or whom and according to
whom?” This seems to be the baseline. One cannot talk
about ritual efficacy without providing answers to this
triple question. There always needs to be something or
somebody that produces some important change for rit-
ual to be efficacious: the efficiens. And there always needs
to be something that is acted upon in ritual: the efficien-
dum.  Finally, there needs to be an interpreting observer
to ascribe the quality of efficacy to the ritual in question.
Efficiens and efficiendum are for logical and language rea-
sons — “to affect” is a two-place predicate — necessary
compounds of theories of efficacy in general.  As such
these two are also necessary for ritual theory in general,
except perhaps for those who would hold that ritual does
not affect anything at all.14
Yet in many cases, to understand any given perspective
on ritual efficacy much more is needed. For example, a re-
searcher might be very much in agreement with a practi-
tioner that the healing ritual they have just witnessed cured
a patient of his illness. Both would assert that the shaman’s
actions (the efficiens) affected the patient (the efficiendum).
But the shaman ascribes the ritual’s efficacy to the spirits,
who were placated by the offerings made: since the spirits
have been reconciled to the patient, they no longer plague
him with bad dreams and hallucinations. The researcher,
on the other hand, is certain that the ritual addressed cer-
tain anxieties rooted in the patient’s psyche and removed
their origin. How do we account for these differences in
perspective? The healing that was witnessed by both shaman
and researcher referred to different “spheres” or “levels” of
efficacy. The shaman’s understanding is concerned with
what we call here— only for the sake of the argument—
the “spiritual sphere”. The spirits are what caused the pa-
tient’s condition, and any ritual action taken to remedy it
must take place in their sphere. For the shaman, the heal-
ing ritual was efficacious solely on a spiritual level. The re-
searcher’s position, on the other hand, is concerned with
the individual’s psyche. Thus, the researcher in this exam-
ple locates the efficacy on the level of psychology. It fol-
lows that the sphere or level at which a ritual is efficacious
might be relevant for statements on ritual efficacy.15
In a similar vein one could distinguish among differ-
ent means by which a ritual can be said to be efficacious.
In our example, the shaman may have used singing, danc-
ing and herbs to induce a trance-like state in the patient.
In the shaman’s perspective, this trance-like state was not
instrumental in healing the patient— it was merely a pre-
requisite to get in touch with the spirits.  The means of
making the ritual efficacious was, to the shaman, the at-
titude of the spirits, as mediated or altered by the offer-
ing that placated them. Of course this offering had to be
made using the proper forms, which happen to include
trance. A researcher might agree that it was the offerings
that were the instrument of ritual efficacy in this case:
they were symbolic to the patient and helped him subli-
mate his anxieties.16 Making offerings was instrumental
in the purely psychological process that healed the pa-
tient. A different researcher might agree that the ritual
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took effect on a psychological level, while still asserting
that it was not the offerings but the dance, singing and
ultimately the trance, as well as the presence of the com-
munity, which allowed the patient to tackle the roots of
his problems. This distinction should serve to make clear
what we intend by the term means,  as opposed to sphere
or level,  of ritual efficacy.
There is in our view one final, particularly helpful ques-
tion that can be asked of a statement about ritual efficacy.
Certain conditions are often perceived as necessary for a
ritual to be efficacious. These include the places where
and times when a ritual is performed, but also other vari-
ables of context, such as the status of certain performers
or participants. The way in which these variables of con-
text influence the ritual’s efficacy can vary, too. To stick
with our example, the shaman might state that the ritual
cannot be efficacious in healing the patient if the patient’s
relatives are not present, for the spirits are ancestral ghosts
tied to the whole family. The researcher may accept this
idea in part, but rather connect the necessity of the fam-
ily’s presence with the patient’s psychological need to ad-
dress certain problems that have arisen from personal re-
lations between the relatives. Other conditions might seem
absolutely necessary to the shaman and totally meaning-
less to the researcher, such as the time of day or the color
of the sacrificial goat’s hair.
So we end up with the following questions that should
be asked of every statement about ritual efficacy:
1. Who or what is held to be efficacious in the
ritual? (efficiens)
2. What is held to be affected in the ritual? (effi-
ciendum)
These are the necessary questions, the ones that define
any statement about ritual efficacy to a large degree. They
are supplemented by further questions that need to be
asked in order to specify particular statements about rit-
ual efficacy, viz.,
3. In what sphere/on what level is the ritual ef-
ficacious?
4. By what means is the ritual efficacious?
5. Under which conditions is the ritual efficacious?
But the five questions posed by us are not as clear-cut
as it might seem. Each of them can be further broken down.
For example, it is important to note that the media in which
the means of ritual efficacy are employed play a role about
which it is hard to generalize. The words of a spell can be
employed in the form of singing or chanting, but they can
also be written down or inscribed in a ritual object. This
is one of many instances in which the broad categorization
given here must be enhanced by detailed distinctions.
The problem is that most theorists who have addressed
the question of ritual efficacy have remained at too gen-
eral a level. Our argument is that any discussion of ritual
efficacy only makes sense if this vague, indeterminate no-
tion is more clearly specified. All this goes to show how
complex and far-reaching a statement about ritual effi-
cacy actually is. It should provide more or less consistent
answers to all these questions, and probably several more
that we did not see fit to include here. Hence asking these
questions not only systematizes but also problematizes
any discussion of ritual efficacy.  Because of the com-
plexities involved we do not ourselves attempt to come
up with a new theory of ritual efficacy. Rather, we want
to suggest how one can break down statements about rit-
ual efficacy, by developing and applying a set of ques-
tions. We will be giving an example of how this can be
applied in the final part of this paper, where we will un-
dertake to demonstrate the uses and limits of this pattern,
by identifying and deconstructing Catherine Bell’s ap-
proach to ritual as practice.
It may seem to the reader that these questions can be
asked about all kinds of human actions. This impression
is correct,  and it is connected to our general under-
standing that ritual or ritualized actions cannot be seen
as a category sui generis,  which is set apart from other
social phenomena and only to be studied on its own.17
Instead, we see ritual as a part of human action in gen-
eral, and hence no less defined by its concern with effi-
cacy than any other human action. However, there are
theories about ritual efficacy which try to establish that
it is subject to a specific logic relating cause and effect, a
logic that is peculiar to (and only to) ritual.  Following
Tambiah’s lead, such theories (e.g. those of Moore and
Myerhoff and Sørensen) often put particular emphasis
not on causal relations, but on the conventional aspect
of the speech-act as set out in a different context by J. L.
Austin.
The influence and appeal of Tambiah’s application of
Austin’s framework rests on the view that some actions seem
to have a sort of “constitutive efficacy”, which means that
they are constitutive of the transitions they bring about.
The utterance (by the right person, under the right cir-
cumstances, etc.) of the sentence “I pronounce you hus-
band and wife” is not the mere description of a relation-
ship, but actually brings about that which it describes. A
Vedic sacrifice, for example, is said to be bring about a de-
sired transformation by simply performing it.18 The same
could be said for the transforming words during the holy
communion of the Catholic Church. Further it is claimed
that some magic spells bring about a desired transforma-
tion by nothing more than uttering (“performing”) them.
In Sørensen’s words:
JOURNAL OF RITUAL STUDIES 24 (1) 2010 19
Austin’s illocutionary acts provide a good basis for
a theory of ritual; they may explain at least part of
what is hidden in Hubert and Mauss’s ‘efficacy sui
generis’.  For an illocutionary act must by definition
be efficacious [ . . . ]. Furthermore, it is efficacious
not only in the sense of a local confidence that it
works, but it does in fact work, and all it needs in
order to work is the local agreement that this is the
way to do it (2006: 526).
Sørensen’s statement rests on Tambiah’s work, where
rituals are seen as “conventional acts”; it boils down to
saying that getting rid of ghosts,  or healing through a
ritual performance, is merely a conventional transition
or a “local agreement”.19 This relates to Austin’s argu-
ment that an illocutionary act is “felicitous” (not “effec-
tive”) if it effects the transition from one conventionally
defined state to another.20 In opposition to this we argue
that it makes sense to ask of a curing ritual why it went
wrong, since this is central for those who perform it. We
are aware of the fact that not all changes between con-
ventional states are necessarily to be seen as matters of
cause and effect.21 We want to draw attention here to
those cases where conventions can be seen as conditions
of efficacy,  which are necessary for a relationship be-
tween efficiens and efficiendum.  A prominent example
for this is a Catholic marriage ceremony. Here two per-
spectives are usually taken. To the truly believing cou-
ple,  the efficiens which joined them in marriage is di-
vine grace, conferred by the priest in the performance
of the sacrament of matrimony.22 In this “insider’s” per-
spective, conventionality never enters the picture (given
that this “inside perspective” is independent of the ques-
tion whether the couple would say that their marriage
is also a socially-recognized convention). However,  an
“outside perspective” that does not rest on the belief in
God will probably put the couple’s faith and the priest’s
actions down under “convention.” Such a position could
for example be in line with Sørensen’s and Tambiah’s
application of Austin’s illocutionary acts to ritual the-
ory. From this “outside perspective” the conventions of
the catholic community, reflected in the couple’s faith,
can be described as the efficiens that makes the priest’s
actions efficacious. Yet,  if one aims to include the “ac-
tors’ point of view” it has to be emphasised again that
the outsider’s description of the couples faith as “con-
ventional” is inappropriate.
Moore and Myerhoff have tried to characterise a re-
lated problem by the opposition between doctrinal and
operational efficacy:
What Moore calls the doctrinal efficacy of religious
ritual is provided by the explanations a religion it-
self gives of how and why ritual works. The expla-
nation is within the religious system and is part of
its internal logic. [ . . .  ] It lacks the dimension of
outcome or consequences which is attributed to op-
erational efficacy.  Results, success, failure are part
of the operational effects of a ritual. These are em-
pirical questions (1977: 12).23
We hold that the fact that “the explanation is within
the religious system” does not change how one would go
about explaining ritual efficacy. Instead, we would make
the point that “the explanations a religion itself gives” can
be seen as the efficiens in this case, while the efficiendum
is simply another part of the doctrine, no matter whether
the doctrine as such is true or false. Note that a doctrine
about efficacy is not a kind of efficacy but a kind of doc-
trine; while “operational efficacy” is neither a form of op-
eration nor a form of efficacy, but a way of designating
the causal consequences of a ritual that matter to an ob-
server. “The explanations a religion itself gives” are what
motivates faith and its effects on, say, a Catholic’s belief.
Whether one argues that the sacrament of marriage con-
stitutes an ontological transformation of the relationship
between the couple or a mere matter of conventions: both
can be described concisely by applying the framework
outlined above.
We have suggested a framework in which questions
about ritual efficacy could be posed. We further prob-
lematized any attempt to make statements about ritual
efficacy by highlighting the ambiguity and indetermi-
nacy of the term “efficacy” and the complexities involved
in making explicit what one holds to be efficacious, and
on what,  in ritual (explanans and explanandum).  Yet,
our framework helps also to find (sometimes implicit)
statements about ritual efficacy in the works of other
scholars.  We propose to use our framework to assist in
this picking-apart of works of scholarship.  As an ex-
ample,  we have chosen Catherine Bell’s rather compli-
cated meditations as a playing field. Her theorizing was
meant to open a door for research about ritual,  and to
do away with unrealistic assumptions,  oversimplifica-
tion, and “false dichotomies”.  But actually Bell did es-
tablish a ritual theory of her own, which was,  on many
levels and in many ways,  fraught with considerations
of ritual efficacy.  Because the analysis of Bell’s theory
will go into greater detail than the above discussion of
other scholars, we have divided it into several short sec-
tions that address specific questions.  After this,  we at-
tempt to show how Bell’s complex theory can be bro-
ken down into simple arguments using the five
questions.
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Catherine Bell’s Approach to 
Ritual Efficacy
Preliminaries
In her 1992 monograph, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice,
Catherine Bell criticized the way in which supposedly basic
distinctions and categorizations had hampered general
understanding of ritual behaviour.24 In particular, she in-
veighed against the distinction between thought and ac-
tion, where the former is the preserve of the ritual ana-
lyst and the latter of the unreflective insider. She argued
that there needed to be more awareness of the linkages
between ritual and other human activity. To this end, she
turned to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. These ponts
then provided her with a way of thinking about ritual acts
that satisfied her need for a more comprehensive use of
the concept of ritual: namely, that ritual is not deed as
opposed to thought, nor does it create a bridge between
these ostensibly separated realms. Rather, it incorporates
both in a way that makes it fruitless, even dangerous, to
separate them at all, albeit in a purely analytical fashion.
Her aim is to make use of Bourdieu’s approach, and un-
derstand ritual activity as the result of the practice of rit-
ualization — or better, as one result of ritualization, since
Bell does not stop here. Apart from applying Bourdieu’s
concept of practice along with his conception of human
habitus, she also works out a complete, if still somewhat
sketchy, mechanism of how ritual(ization) might work in
practice. This move was founded on the idea that ritual-
ization does not (only) do what is ascribed to it from the
native point of view— e.g. placating gods, marrying peo-
ple, purifying the spirit — but something on a whole dif-
ferent level of analysis: that it produces, reproduces, and
reconfigures power relations. Keeping in mind our ob-
jective, the analysis of ritual theories in accordance with
our ideas on ritual efficacy, this presents a challenge. We
will now try to show, however, that it merely adds a fur-
ther level of intricacy to our observations — one that will
hopefully prove more of a boon than a hindrance. To this
end, we must first explain Bell’s approach in more detail,
especially with respect to ritual efficacy. Second, we will
discuss the different levels of ritual efficacy that are im-
plicit in her model. Third, the questions we have outlined
above will be put to the test in a concise analysis of Bell’s
overall understanding of ritual efficacy. The paper will be
rounded up with some general concluding remarks.
Practice
Practice is arguably the most important term in Bell’s
theoretical lexicon. Unfortunately, its common usage is
also highly ambiguous and often seems to strengthen the
basic dichotomization between thought and deed that Bell
has set out to overcome (Bell 1992: 75–79). Taking more
than one page from Pierre Bourdieu’s book Outline of a
Theory of Practice (2002, [1977]), Bell claims that “prac-
tice must be taken as a nonsynthetic and irreducible term
for human activity” (1992: 81). Practice, while not actu-
ally defined by Bell herself at any point in her 1992 work,
can be understood as following Bourdieu’s notion of a di-
alectical relationship between an objectified, structured en-
vironment and the social activity of people (1992: 78; Bour-
dieu 2002: 3,  79, 87). Bell is most interested in what a
theory of ritual as practice has to offer. She puts it like this:
[T]he study of ritual as practice has meant a basic
shift from looking at activity as the expression of
cultural patterns to looking at it as that which
makes and harbors such patterns. . . . [P]ractice the-
orists tend to explore how ritual is a vehicle for the
construction of relationships of authority and sub-
mission (1997: 82; original italics).
Studying ritual as practice means studying what ritual
“really” does, on a deeply sociological level. Ritualization,
then, is efficacious in that it constructs and/or reconfig-
ures the society — in Bourdieuian terms, the field — in
which it takes place.25 The reader will already suspect that
Bell follows some of the notions established by Durkheim.
The idea that ritual is all about constructing hierarchies
as opposed to, say, marrying a couple or healing a pa-
tient, supports this suspicion. But before we go into this
further,  it will be well to develop an understanding of
Bell’s central stipulation: the sense of ritual.
Sense of ritual
The reconfiguration of the society through ritual prac-
tice is, according to Bell, rooted in its power in and over
the body.  In practice,  it is the individual’s socially in-
formed body that acts and is acted upon. The body is in-
formed by its own cultural habitus,  as well as its envi-
ronment as perceived by its senses (1992: 80).  For
Bourdieu, the socially informed body encompasses all the
traits and quirks that make up an individual-within-so-
ciety. Its senses include all “tastes and distastes, compul-
sions and repulsions” (2002: 124) that grow over time,
adding to the traditional five powers of sight,  hearing,
smell,  taste and touch. The socially informed body de-
velops additional senses with which it gauges socially con-
structed categories such as beauty, justice, or even busi-
ness opportunities.  For Bell,  it is clear that “in most
societies the ‘sense of ritual’ would be a vital addition to
this list” (1992: 80).
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It is this ritual sense that enables ritualization to
work — and that is in turn created by it.  Ritualization’s
main function is,  in the first instance, to set a ritualized
activity apart from everyday activity.  It follows that rit-
ualization must (meta-) communicate, in the act of rit-
ualizing,  that ritualization is taking place right here,
right now. This is closely connected to the concept of
framing as developed by Gregory Bateson and others
(Bateson 1973: 157–163; 1991).  Ritualization, given a
voice,  would say, “This is different,  deliberate,  and sig-
nificant — pay attention!” (Bell 1997: 160).26 The basic
function of ritualization is to create a distinction be-
tween ritualized and non-ritualized, and thus, accept-
able and unacceptable,  ways of doing the task at hand
(Bell 1992: 81f.).
The ritual sense is one of the central parts of Bell’s ar-
gument, and it seems to be related to the logical distinc-
tion between efficiens and efficiendum. But what does Bell’s
ritual sense actually do? In ritualization, is it efficacious,
a causer of effects, or is it affected, a receiver of effects?
The answer to this simple question is complicated, for
Bell, following Bourdieu, sees social action as a “dialec-
tic” relationship. On one hand, ritual sense enables par-
ticipants to create ritualized space, because without it,
this space could not be perceived as ritualized. On the
other hand, it confers the means, namely what Bell calls
the “schemes” — another term borrowed from
Bourdieu — of ritualization, to the performer. The dis-
tinction, the perceived extraordinary quality which an ac-
tivity or situation derives from its ritualization, is de-
pendent on the sense of ritual.  Therefore,  in one
perspective, ritual sense can be seen as an efficiendum of
ritualization, while the ritual-sense-imbued performance
is the efficiens.  But ritualization does not just set an ac-
tivity or situation apart: according to Bell its main effi-
cacy is sociological in nature. Thus, there is more than
one level of efficacy that could be identified in her work.
The conclusion that the ritual sense is the main efficien-
dum holds true for only one of the levels of ritual efficacy
assumed by Bell — based on Bourdieu’s concept of sense
and aesthetics one might call it the “aesthetic level”.
Ritual and Power
The sense of ritual not only lets the participant un-
derstand what is going on in a given ritualization, it also
allows the individual to participate in an appropriate and
meaningful way, and, to borrow Bell’s term, “empowers”
him (ibid: 181). This empowerment usually takes the form
of what she calls “redemptive hegemony” (ibid: 83f.).27
The empowerment takes the form of passive knowledge
rooted in the ritualized body: each and every participant
in a ritualization knows what to expect, and how to act
properly and productively.
This knowledge is an integral part of the individuals’
ritual sense and leads to the production, reproduction
and, sometimes, reconfiguration of power relations. For
in the practice of ritualization, an activity is made out to
be not only important, but significant, meaningful, and
legitimate (ibid: 193–196). Thus, being able to apply the
“schemes” of ritualization to an activity allows domina-
tion of the ritualized situation, provides a rule set tacitly
followed by all participants — including the performer —
and legitimizes that activity. For this reason, power rela-
tions constructed in ritualized space are likely to endure
in the participants’ understanding of social reality.
A second level of ritual efficacy has now opened up.
The actors or performers still constitute the efficiens,  but
what they do in ritualization is not only to make their ac-
tions extraordinary, but also to use this conferred extra-
ordinariness to bring about sociological effects. The effi-
ciendum is no longer the individuals’ ritual sense per se,
but their understanding of how society is structured, and
of their own role in this structure. Collectively spoken,
one could also say that, on the sociological level, the ef-
ficiendum of ritualization is the sum of societal power re-
lations addressed in it.
Understanding Schemes of Ritualization
The concept of redemptive hegemony is founded on
the assertion that power structures displayed in ritual-
izations are perceived as universal truths of societal rela-
tionships by the practitioners. If this display were seen to
be a mere product of ritualization, it would be nothing
more than this: a mere show of power, not an activity in-
strumentally aimed at specific goals, e.g. marrying peo-
ple or healing a patient. But to Bell one of the most fun-
damental features of human practice is that it is
“embedded in a misrecognition of what it is in fact doing”
(ibid: 81). This misrecognition is one that misinterprets
“the relationship between its ends and its means in ways
that promote its efficacy” (1997: 81). Practice is “known”
to be the proper, acceptable way to act. And it is this “em-
bodied knowledge” that is reflected in the individuals’ rit-
ual sense. Ritualization, to quote Bell again, “is a partic-
ularly ‘mute’ form of activity. It is designed to do what it
does without bringing what it is doing across the thresh-
old of discourse or systematic thinking” (1992: 93). It is
the special “design” of ritual schemes which makes them
usable to bring about the effects of ritualization: they are
designed to promote the image of ritual practice being
“useful” for instrumental purposes, while keeping their
“real agenda” — namely, affecting power relations — hid-
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den. Schemes of ritualization are, generally speaking, the
means by which it is efficacious.28
Privileged Dichotomization and Encryption of
Meaning
So how do schemes of ritualization work as a means
to ritual efficacy? Bell’s fundamental approach here is one
that corresponds closely with that of the first part of Rit-
ual Theory, Ritual Practice.  She holds that ritualization is
founded on certain basic dichotomies,  which she calls
“privileged oppositions” (1992: 101). These she takes to
be constructed in a way that facilitates further hierar-
chization (hence “privileged”). Ritualized space is struc-
tured by these oppositions that are then, in the course of
ritual, reinterpreted as hierarchical differentiations. Spa-
tial dichotomies like below/above,  outside/inside,
right/left,  and so on are associated with dichotomous
concepts outside ritual space.  Such dichotomous con-
cepts could be: mundane/spiritual; unclean/clean; fe-
male/male; outsider/member of the community; and so
on. It is easy to see how these dichotomies can be turned
into hierarchical systems. In ritualized space, they would
be represented by the simpler,  more tangible physical-
spatial distinctions, which are perceived by the partici-
pants’ sense of ritual. Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween two terms or principles,  such as male-female, is
understood as being homologous to another relationship
between two principles, such as strong-weak, pure-im-
pure, soul-body, spiritual-mundane, powerful-power-
less, and so on.
This deferral of meaning is one in which one set of
oppositions in ritual stands for another in daily life, not
wholly unlike Radcliffe-Brown’s “double oppositions”
(for a summary,  see Singer 1984: 11–14): in ritual,  a
purely logical or “symbolic opposition” is used in such
a way that the participants unthinkingly insert a “struc-
tural opposition” of the natural world that is connected
with it (see Radcliffe-Brown 1948: 234f.).  According to
Bell it is by this Derrida-like “endless différence”,  that
is,  endless deferral of meaning that never actually
reaches a conclusion, that ritual can keep the lid on the
secret of what it “really” does (1992: 104–107; cf.  Der-
rida 1978 passim).  The meaning of ritual is encrypted
by many layers of meaningfulness that never arrive any-
where and thus allow ritualization as a practice to func-
tion. If this endless deferral of meaning is to function,
there must be a certain amount of common under-
standing among the participants.  Each step of mean-
ing-deferral must occur automatically and uncon-
sciously,  and for this to happen, the participants must
be embedded in similar semiotic fields (language, sym-
bolism, body language, . . .  ). The existence of this semi-
otic common ground (which could be summarized as
a shared “culture”) seems to be the most significant con-
dition for ritualization to function.  This condition is
quite independent of the level of efficacy,  whether aes-
thetic-psychological or sociological.  But it seems clear
that Bell is mostly interested in the “real”,  i.e.  sociolog-
ical efficacy of ritualization. A shared ritual culture is
therefore to be understood as a condition of bringing
about social effects in ritual.
Summary of Bell’s Theory with respect to Ritual
Efficacy
Although one cannot but form the impression that
Bell’s approach is largely concerned with power rela-
tions (esp.1992: 131ff.),  we want to stress that it is
strongly related to general issues of ritual efficacy. From
one perspective,  Bell’s assumed efficiens is ritualization
as performed by those persons who manage to domi-
nate a situation by ritualizing it.  They are not aware of
it,  but the ritualization they enact confers power on
them. From this perspective the object on which ritu-
alization must have an effect to work is the commonly
shared ritual sense.  This is Bell’s efficiendum,  since rit-
ualization acts on the ritual sense of everyone present.
However,  it does so only if there is enough common
ground and if these individuals already possess an acute
sense of ritual.  Here the self-referentiality of ritualiza-
tion in Bell’s position becomes obvious.  The sense of
ritual is produced and producing by taking part in rit-
ualization. Hence,  ritualization is also its own object,
in the sense that it leads the way to its next instance and
therefore the ritual sense can be seen as the efficiens from
another perspective.
Based on these observation one can see how ritualiza-
tion works, i.e. is efficacious, on two distinct levels that
are mutually dependent. First, ritualization works on the
level of individual perception and misperception. Ritu-
alization works by creating in the participants’ perspec-
tive on actions a differentiation between the ritualized
and the non-ritualized. These are never expressed clearly
as such, but worked into a structuring of ritualized space,
which in turn imprints itself on the participants’ bod-
ies — what we have called the “aesthetic level”.
On a more refined level, though, this efficaciousness
of ritualization in individual bodies is the means to an
end. Ritualized bodies in ritualized space make up a ma-
trix of social hierarchies, and it is here that social change
can be effected, since the differentiation between the rit-
ualized and the non-ritualized is a distinction from which
flow all the other privileged dichotomies in ritualized
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space. Hence, the second level on which Bell finds ritual
efficacy at work would have to be recognized as the fab-
ric of hierarchy and authority in a given society: the “so-
ciological level” of Bell’s ritual efficacy.29
On both of these levels the most important inde-
pendent variable in understanding ritualization would be
the different “schemes” employed in specific ritualizations.
These schemes can be read as generalized strategies of rit-
ualization, or better yet as a kind of “practical mastery”,
to borrow Bourdieu’s term. They are the means by which
the success of a given ritualization can be ensured: de-
pending on the situation and on the ritual sense of those
present, the schemes employed in a ritualization make or
break its efficacy. As discussed above, the most impor-
tant schemes revolve around certain privileged di-
chotomizations and their involvement with semiotic sys-
tems. These are subject to great cultural variation, but we
cannot pursue this matter here.
Finally, one might argue with respect to the conditions
under which ritualization can be efficacious that all par-
ticipants must be fitted with a ritual sense, and that this
ritual sense must be largely convergent where important
matters are concerned. At times Bell seems to imply that
she does not consider this a necessity, e.g. when she talks
about the construction of a ritual sense through partici-
pation in ritualizations. There must, however, be a suf-
ficiently great common pool of cultural dispositions
among all concerned for any one given ritualization to
work.30 Schemes of ritualization cannot function when
the senses of ritual they modify and create are too diverse.
Ritualization,  for Bell,  does not wholly cross cultural
boundaries — although this crossing might be facilitated
by taking part in cross-cultural ritualizations. In sum-
mary, one can say that Bell seems to understand the re-
lation of ritualization to power relationships almost as a
simple cause-and-effect one:
Relationships of power are drawn from the social
body and then reappropriated by the social body as
experience. Specific relations of domination and
subordination are generated and orchestrated by
the participants themselves simply by participating.
Within the intricacies of this objectification and
embodiment lies the ability of ritualization to cre-
ate social bodies in the image of relationships of
power, social bodies that are these very relation-
ships of power (1992: 206; original italics).
So, in comparison to our earlier examples, how does
Bell tackle the “problem of efficacy” posed by Ahern? To
repeat Ahern’s phrase once more: “For some cases,  we
might want to say participants think their rituals have a
certain effect; in actuality the effect they have is quite dif-
ferent” (1979: 6). It seems that Bell quite agrees that one
can identify a dichotomy between what participants
“think” ritual does, and what it does “in actuality”. We
have identified two levels on which ritualization, accord-
ing to Bell, is efficacious: on an aesthetic level,  ritualiza-
tion is efficacious in that it addresses, manipulates and
creates the participants’ ritual sense.  On a sociological
level,  it is efficacious in that it constructs,  reconstructs
and manipulates societal power structures. Another level
remains completely uninvestigated, namely, the level that
is directly concerned with the participants’ perceptions
of what they are doing. By introducing Bourdieu’s con-
cept of habitus, Bell can eliminate the participants’ per-
spective from the equation: Since, in her opinion, ritu-
alization is “embedded in a misrecognition of what it is
in fact doing” (1992: 81), the actual (non-mis)recognition
of what ritual is (supposedly) doing, as seen through the
participants’ eyes, goes missing. Thus, in certain crucial
respects to do with efficacy,  Bell seems to follow
Durkheim.
Conclusion
We set out to show how the notion of ritual efficacy
is — largely implicitly — constantly at work in the study
of ritual.  A brief discussion of the work of some of the
most famous scholars in this field (Frazer,  Durkheim,
and Tambiah) showed how much they were struggling
with the “problem of ritual efficacy”: while Frazer was
of the opinion that ritual,  to put it bluntly, simply does
not work, Durkheim tried to avoid the “problem of rit-
ual efficacy” altogether.  This,  however,  led to the un-
fortunate distinction between instrumental and sym-
bolic/expressive efficacy.  A variation of this problem
shows prominently in Tambiah’s work and also made an
impact on other scholars such as Moore and Myerhoff
and, most recently, Sørensen. We stressed the point that
it is important to see how some authors in their posi-
tions try to get to “the actors’ point of view” while oth-
ers claim it is the “duty of science” to discover the “real
efficacy”.31
Besides tracing this line of theorizing, we argued that
the efficacy of ritual is not different from the efficacy of
other,  more ordinary action.  Rather than postulating
an efficacy specific to ritual actions we proposed a set
of five questions that can also be applied to other ac-
tions. The application of these specific questions to rit-
ual efficacy makes obvious precisely where — to come
back to one example we used — a researcher and a
shaman,  or two different researchers,  differ.  The an-
thropologist says that a healing ritual was efficacious be-
cause the family was united through the ritual,  the
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shaman says it was efficacious because the gods accepted
the offerings, while a second researcher states that it was
not efficacious because it did not remove the symptoms
of the patient. Thus, very often we do not deal with “the
problem of ritual efficacy” but with the problem of what
“ritual efficacy” does and does not mean in each case,
which we suggest to tackle by application of our five spe-
cific questions.
These considerations come together in our final dis-
cussion of Bell’s position in Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice.
We have shown that an application of our five specific
questions can also help a great deal to analyze and unfold
complex and multi-layered positions in regard to ritual
efficacy such as Catherine Bell’s.
Our five efficacy-related questions show the complexi-
ties involved in any statement about ritual efficacy. Our ar-
gument is that given these complexities, we should avoid
the broad and general notion of “ritual efficacy” and in-
stead ask more specific questions about specific rituals—
as a species of the genus action— in the first place. Having
said this we still hold that the application of the interpre-
tative grid we proposed above is a helpful instrument to
identify positions and problems in statements about ritu-
als with respect to ritual efficacy. Our systematic way of
questioning statements about ritual efficacy in other the-
ories proved to be helpful. However, our analysis showed
that general statements about ritual efficacy are highly ques-
tionable.
Endnotes
1. We would like to thank Don Gardner, William Sax, and Jan
Weinhold for their very helpful critical reading and remarks on ear-
lier versions of this paper.
2. In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (1993) Ludwig
Wittgenstein charges Sir James Frazer with not taking seriously the
context of ritual performances. The rain dance Frazer refers to is,
for example, supposedly only danced during the rainy season. All
the rituals we describe in this paper are more or less stripped of
the specificities and complexities that figure prominently in good
ethnographic descriptions of them. But this reduction serves our
purpose, since we argue that even with respect to such simplified
examples an attempt to give a precise attribution of ritual efficacy
is highly questionable. In the complexities of social life the prob-
lems we outline here in the abstract are only further complicated.
3. Exceptions are besides Ahern’s article “The Problem of Rit-
ual Efficacy” (1979), for example Jesper Sørensen’s “Efficacy” (2006),
and Sax 2004, 2008a and 2008b — all strongly influenced by Tam-
biah’s positions.
4. The term intellectualists refers to the fact that these scholars
saw religion as an attempt to provide “intellectual” answers to a set
of questions centrally involving specific intellectual operations such
as observation,  explanation,  etc.  These intellectual operations,
grounded in our basic cognitive capacities, were further asserted
to be universal, part of the common heritage of human beings.
5. Skorupski argues that the analytical aim of Tylor “that we
ought always to look for practical and intelligible motives for the
habits and opinions we find existing in the world” ([1866: 86]
quoted Skorupski 1976: 3) can be separated from the question
whether these motives are based on true or false beliefs about the
world.  We argue that this is possible,  but it is clear that Tylor’s
and — even more so — Frazer’s rhetoric focussed on the falsity of
most “primitive beliefs”.
6. Other famous symbolists include e.g.  Leach,  who, in his
book Culture and Communication, distinguishes “technical actions,
which serve to alter the physical state of the world out there — dig-
ging a hole in the ground, boiling an egg,” from “expressive actions,
which either simply say something about the state of the world as
it is,  or else purport to change it by metaphysical means” (1976:
22). In The Forest of Symbols (1967) Victor Turner writes: “By ‘rit-
ual’ I mean prescribed formal behaviour for occasions not given
over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in mysti-
cal beings and powers. The symbol is the smallest unit of ritual”
(1967: 19). Radcliffe-Brown, to give another well known example,
writes in his Frazer Lecture on Taboo (1939) that “all ritual acts dif-
fer from technical acts in having in all instances some expressive
and symbolic element in them” (Reprinted in Lessa & Vogt 1979:
52). In all three cases, ritual can be distinguished as a symbolic (or
expressive) rather than a technical (or instrumental) act.
7. The main positions within the rationality debate are com-
piled in the books Modes of Thought (1973) edited by Horton &
Finnegan, Rationality (1970) edited by Wilson and the volume Ra-
tionality and Relativism (1982) edited by Lukes and Hollis. In Ger-
many the debate was revisited in the books Magie (1978, 1995) ed-
ited by Kippenberg & Luchesi and Der Wissenschaftler und das
Irrationale (1981) edited by Dürr.
8. See fn. 6; cf. Skorupsky 1976.
9. Compare Tambiah’s statement that “ritualized, convention-
alized, stereotyped behaviour is constructed in order to express and
communicate, and is publicly construed as expressing and com-
municating certain attitudes congenial to an ongoing institution-
alized intercourse” (1985: 132).
10. In the introduction to his collection of essays Culture, Thought,
and Social Action he summarizes his position on ritual efficacy and
causality: “I have become increasingly hostile to attempts that place
ritual acts . . . solely or mainly within the framework of ‘causality.’
Such an approach entails declaring something ‘true’ or ‘false’ in terms
of verification rules as postulated in positivist science— or even in
terms of Popper’s criterion of ‘falsifiability’” (1985: 2).
11. Cf. the examples given by Ahern in direct contestation of
Tambiah’s position (1979: 2) along with many more examples of
people who seek to achieve by means of rituals things that are im-
possible in terms of “ordinary forces” as they conceive of them.
12. We thank Don Gardner for drawing our attention to this
point, and to the fact that Skorupski (1976) made the same critique
as ours against Leach and Beattie, with respect to their opposition
between the symbolic-expressive and the technical/instrumental.
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Jack Goody also observed (1977) that in many cases the term “rit-
ual” is used by researchers only for those practices where the means
used seem inappropriate to the intended. Asad (1993: 55) advanced
similar positions and cf. also Sax (2008) for a variation of the point
of Goody.
13. To reformulate our position in other words: Actions,
whether ritualized or not (and like all other events in the world),
produce effects. This is, after all, what gives point to taking action.
But not all of the effects are those at which the action aims at, i.e.
what the people performing the action intend to do. The effects of
a marriage ceremony in a church can include, among others, the
following two: the establishment of a kinship relation and a de-
crease in the number of oxygen molecules in the church. Both are
a consequence of the ritual action but the latter is, so to speak, a
collateral effect of the action and therefore it is not part of the ac-
tion, for it is entirely unintended. In the explanation why people
perform rituals the perspective of the actors (their intentions) can
be seen therefore as having a privileged status, since only they can
explain why the people performed the ritual action at all.
14. The discussion of this problem would deserve a further arti-
cle since it would have to address two different lines of debate. On
the one hand there is the “meaninglessness debate” initiated by Fritz
Staal (1979) and carried on till the present day by scholars like
Humphrey and Laidlaw (1992) and most recently by Axel Michaels
(2006). On the other hand there is the position outlined in Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (1993) and discussed,
for example, in Ahern (1979), De Lara (2003) and Quack (2009).
15. Of course the sphere or level of ritual efficacy (as well as
the further differentiations we will make) can be subsumed in a
sufficiently complex definition of the relationship between the ef-
ficiens and the efficiendum. Yet in this case it seems to be more
helpful to state that both agreed that the point of the ritual was to
cure the patient’s illness, while the differentiation between differ-
ent levels of illness (spiritual and psychological) draws attention to
the discrepancies of perspective.
16. The classical statement of this theory is James Dow’s arti-
cle “Universal Aspects of Symbolic Healing” (1986).
17. By this claim we deliberately take issue with Humphrey and
Laidlaw’s view that ritual actions are qualitatively different from
ordinary actions (the difference is,  according to Humphrey and
Laidlaw, that the identity of ritualized actions does not depend on
the intentions of the agents in action cf. 1994: 89ff.) as well as with
any other attempt to approach ritual “sui generis” or “in its own
right,” the latter being famously argued by Don Handelman (2005).
18. Cf. for example Humphrey and Laidlaw who characterize
the vedic sacrifice as a “classic example of an automatically effica-
cious ritual” (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994: 13, 37).
19. For the first formulation of this criticism see Gardner (1983):
“Both Tambiah and Ahern have made the mistake of characteris-
ing the whole of a complex sequence of acts in terms of the prop-
erties of certain parts of them. A ritual to exorcize ghosts or to en-
list the aid of the ancestors may involve illocutionary acts but this
does not mean that the ritual as a whole is performative in the re-
quired sense. For an act to be performative there must be conven-
tions governing the procedure and the state of affairs in which it
effects; being a naturalised citizen is to have undergone the requi-
site ceremony in a way that being someone who has been cleansed
of demonic influence is not. [ . . . ] Tambiah and Ahern have ap-
parently taken the nonempirical nature of the entities that figure
in the rituals to entail that they are merely constructions of con-
ventions” (Gardner 1983: 349). The main argument of the article
is that this observation is equally true with respect to the initiation
rituals of the Mianmin of Papua New Guinea.
20. As Austin put it: “There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to in-
clude the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain cir-
cumstances” (1971: 26— emphasis ours). Tambiah, in turn, objected
the view that “in their magic and ritual the primitives tried to achieve
results through ‘causal’ reasoning and failed” (attributed to Frazer
as well as Popperians) (2006: 358). He rather holds: “The corre-
sponding objectives in (magical) ritual are ‘persuasion,’ ‘conceptu-
alization,’ ‘expansion of meaning’ and the like, and the criteria of ad-
equacy are better conveyed by notions such as ‘validity,’ ‘correctness,’
‘legitimacy,’ and ‘felicity’ of the ceremony performed” (2006: 359).
21. See Skorupski’s discussion of causality and conventions where
he states that “we need carry out no statistical investigations to dis-
cover whether all men who get married become husbands; not be-
cause there is here an obvious causal relationship, but because the
relationship is not causal at all. Being a husband (judge, peer) is a
social status in my sense of being a rule-constituted condition; and
it is in this sense that operative actions can be said to take non-causal
effect on social states of affairs” (Skorupski 1976: 104).
22. Many church members might question whether this medi-
ation is to be seen as a real manifestation of the invisible. If in this
case the actors agree with the explanation of the researcher no prob-
lem arises. But in our case we speak of a “truly believing couple.”
In another context the ritual practitioners do not even make the
distinction between symbolic and instrumental efficacy that many
Catholics and most researchers might make nowadays (cf. e.g. Sko-
rupski’s discussion of Evans-Pritchard’s account of the installation
of the divine king of the Shilluk parallel to the catholic marriage
ceremony 1976: 102–107). In any case, our point is that the fact
that one theological explanation is not shared by all the believers
cannot legitimize an approach in which the researcher declares what
is symbolic or conventional and what is not while still aiming to
describe or reflect the “natives point of view.”
23. Cf. for the application of Tambiah in this respect Moore
(1977: 167f.).
24. The 1997 monograph, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions
will not be taken into account much in this paper, since that work’s
aim was not to provide a new theoretical framework for under-
standing ritual, but to present up-to-date ritual theory in a compre-
hensive way and analyze it following certain criteria and categories.
We are more concerned with Bell’s own theoretical approach, which
was based on the idea that in ritual, thought and action are non-dis-
tinguishable categories. We shall see that Bell herself does not strictly
adhere to this baseline in her 1992 work. However, Ritual: Perspec-
tives and Dimensions does offer a concise summary of Bell’s own,
older thoughts, of which we will take advantage now and then.
25. Although Bell relies heavily on Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habi-
tus’ she never discusses how one could establish the complemen-
tary — and equally necessary — ‘field’ or ‘milieu’ to which the ‘rit-
ual habitus’ corresponds.
26. Unfortunately Bell never makes it clear what it is that makes
ritualization a specific way of setting up action from everyday ac-
tion. Cf. Quack (2009) for a further critique and an extensive dis-
cussion of her notion of ritual sense.
27. This concept is partly based on an understanding of hege-
mony as a system of sub-conscious, ascribed qualities and mean-
ings (Gramsci 1957: 174ff., 186f.). Its other root is the concept of
“redemptive processes”, the basic idea being that in all social processes,
power relations give something back to the people that construct
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them, namely, knowledge about their proper place and behaviour
(Burridge 1986: 6f.). Ritualization empowers individuals by defin-
ing a sphere of action: a space, time and scope in which their ac-
tions must take place. This definition is common knowledge among
individuals possessed of a sense of ritual,  thus helping each one
gauge the effectiveness and likely outcome of different possible paths
of action.
28. Bell devotes a large part of Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice to
a description of their properties and characteristics. It seems clear
that ritual schemes and their properties demand much more atten-
tion than we can give them in this paper. Unfortunately, Bell never
explicitly developed a typology or categorization of ritual schemes.
For this reason alone, we cannot delve very deeply into this matter.
29. Bell writes: “Ritualization is first and foremost a strategy
for the construction of certain types of power relationships ef-
fective within particular social organizations” (1992: 197). That
this can be so follows straight from Foucault’s idea that the place
where power takes effect is the body (Foucault 1979: 25, 28). Nat-
urally,  then, ritualization can be used to great effect in creating
and manipulating power relations.  Sadly,  Bell seems to have
missed her aim “to confront the act itself ” (1992: 80),  delving
into the sociological level of efficacy, which derives from a highly
etic perspective, instead of taking a view closer to that of the prac-
titioners.
30. See the ethnographic example of Quack (2009), who dis-
cusses spiritual seekers from the West in an ashram in Rishikesh.
They lack a pool of cultural dispositions in common with the In-
dians in the ashram. Therefore they take to performing the same
rituals at the same time, but separated from each other.
31. Of course it is not our intention to disparage the sociolog-
ical approach to ritual activities in general. Rather, we would like
to clarify how much perspectivity must — almost by necessity —
be expected in any statement about ritual efficacy. The practition-
ers’ perspective seems to be sorely lacking in many of them, even
if this is explicitly claimed not to be the case, as we tried to show
in our discussion of Tambiah’s work.
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